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INTRODUCTION
Many disciplines reason with causal networks and must represent them. Within a discipline, multiple tasks and tools must share the information in causal. There are several efforts underway in different disciplines, all aimed at defining an interchange standard for causal networks. The current effort surveys emerging standards in Systems Engineering, medical reasoning, Bayesian networks and the representation of procedures.
All these efforts are generally moving towards XML representations of causality, but choosing XML (or RDF or OWL) is but a first step in defining a representation. Some basics are central to all the disciplines and will certainly be part of any emergent standard -• There are events and conditions;
• They have causal links between them;
• Events, conditions and causes have associated probabilities;
• Causes combine via logical operators (AND, OR and NOT.)
The thrust of this paper is toward describing the types of causal phenomena that could be captured in a comprehensive interchange format.
We have had discussions with practitioners in each of these disciplines. We elicited descriptions of the causal phenomena that are useful and common in reasoning tasks, but which present representational difficulties. It is our hope that discussing these hard representational problems, with examples drawn from multiple domains, will drive the emergence of interchange formats that can represent the most complex causal phenomena and that can be shared across very different disciplines.
Standard formats for interchange, autogeneration and comprehensibility
Users need standard formats so that they can model systems without being tied to a single tool or vendor. Moreover, users need standard formats so that they can automatically generate inputs from electronic sources. Fault-tree analysis (and the related PRA) illustrate this. There are several available tools and vendors for these analyses, each with its own virtues. Models built in one tool are not generally readable by the others. But there's a larger problem. Fault trees built in any of these tools are manually entered. The knowledge source for this data entry has mostly come from some other electronic data source. E.g., it is taken from functional allocations, the FMEA reports, the utility connectivity (power, data, thermal, lube) and schematics (CAD, wiring diagrams, P&ID.) This entry is incompletecarrying all the relevant data from the sources is too laborious for a manual effort, so available information (part numbers, locations codes, the design engineer's name) is omitted. Worse, as soon as the fault tree is built, it is severed from its sources. The system changes; its design changes; its parts are substituted, renamed and renumbered; its documentation is corrected. These updates do not flow into the fault trees.
Standard interchange formats for causal modeling tools will greatly reduce the manual data entry and resulting errors and omissions. Users will automatically generate and update causal models from verified and version-controlled sources. Users will be able to import causal information from libraries -libraries whose use can span multiple tools. This will also enable the analysis tools to add features that manual data entry renders impractical -features such as hyperlinks to manuals, photography, or viewing the source files (functional allocations, schematics FMEA sheets etc.) Causal graphs have two very different major uses. They are employed so that automated inference engines can read them and perform analysis -automated diagnosis or PRA. But they also aid human comprehension -people look at (sometimes huge) causal graphs, asking questions. "What went wrong? What would have to fail before we lost this capability?" An interchange standard must not only address whether a format is machine-readable. It must also ensure that the encoded knowledge is human-inspectable. It's not enough that machines understand these models. We have to, too.
CAUSAL MODELS AND INTERCHANGE

FORMATS
In researching this work, we have been in contact with several groups in different disciplines that are working on interchange format standards for causal graphs or things akin to causal graphs. The groups may learn from each other and might borrow other group's best ideas. Accordingly, this section and the next will review briefly • Knowledge representations in different disciplines, highlighting any unusual or especially useful concepts, capabilities and representations.
• Vocabularies as aids to making the semantics of a node explicit, available both to the tool and the user.
• Our own work interchanging event sequences between an ontology and a simulation engine • Several emerging standards for interchange formats
• Representational challenges -causal relationships that are difficult to represent; attention to these during standards formulation might extend the representational scope.
We've mentioned several fields that use causal models. These represent scenarios as directed graphs (often trees) of causally linked events. Some features are common across all the domains and most of the tools. Nodes in the graphs generally represent events or conditions; edges represent causality. There are special nodes in the graph, called gates, which combine causation through simple logical operators (AND, OR, NOT) or higher-order operators (XOR, NAND, K-OF-M or arbitrary truth tables.) The models are usually built with nodes uniformly either being successes or failures. As Figure 1 shows, there are methods for transforming between success-space representations and failure-space representations. Nodes with only incoming edges (such as the root of a tree) represent some final state of interest. Nodes with only outgoing edges (the leaves of a tree) are 'basic events' for which no causal explanation is necessary or available. Probabilities -representing the likelihood or frequency of a condition being true -are associated with the basic events and can be computed for other nodes. 
Causal models in various fields
Let us review the prominent causal-network representations from different fields, and any associated interchange formats. Our interest in interchange formats for causal models was sparked by our risk-analysis work in functional and physical models [10] . Our software generates event sequences for potential accident scenarios. We needed to communicate these scenarios between software tools. We sought any existing interchange formats, rather than inventing our own. Practitioners in many fields perform causal modeling; our work is most akin to the work in fault trees.
In fault trees, [17] the root of the tree is some 'top event' -a failure that has occurred and is being investigated, or a potential failure to guard against. Analysis generates 'cut sets' -sets of basic events that are sufficient to cause the top event. Fault trees are composable -fault trees for individual components can be produced separately, and a system level fault tree can reference them. Some causal propagation depends on a system's state or configuration; Dynamic Fault trees conditionalize subtrees accordingly.
In some situations, causes are mutually reinforcing. The fault tree methodology does not allow circular causality; there are techniques for breaking these feedback loops.
Probabilistic Risk/Reliability Assessment (PRA) [15] is an extension to fault trees wherein probabilities are assigned to the nodes and the likelihood of the top event is calculated. It is customarily used to evaluate likelihood of success of an overall project or mission, and to focus attention on areas where loss is most likely to occur. The extension noted for Dynamic Fault trees allows PRA to span missions where the configuration and the risks repeatedly change; e.g. the launch, mission and return of a spacecraft
The software suites, SAPHIRE [14] , CAFTA and GALILEO [23] are the most-used fault-tree analysis and PRA tools in aerospace. SAPHIRE and CAFTA are descended from SET, a 1980's era fault tree tool. Its file format became a de facto standard interchange format. SAPHIRE, CAFTA and some other tools can save models in this format. But the fault tree field has advanced. SET's format is inadequate today; for instance, it can represent the combination of two conditions (AND or OR,) but not the negation of a condition (NOT.) It does not encode events' probabilities (e.g. Mean Time Between Failure, MTBF.) There is no common interchange format between SAPHIRE and CAFTA, but there is a NASAcommissioned software that translates between SAPHIRE's MAR-D format and CAFTA.
Root cause analysis [3] represents scenarios similarly to fault trees. It concentrates mainly on analyzing undesirable events that have already occurred. The trees are built in failure space. Nodes, gates and edges have essentially the same semantics as in fault tree. Probabilities are not represented and cut sets are not generated. Root cause analysis allows inclusion of causes that were not present in the actual sequence -alternative conditions which could have caused or prevented the loss, if they had been present. It has an explicit representation of when causal chains have crossed organizational boundaries (and are thus out of the direct control of the investigating team.)
Procedures are event sequences and there is normally at least an implicit causal linkage between procedure steps. COPMA III [2] has developed an Extensible Procedure Action, or XPA, as an XML representation of procedures. XPA does not represent probabilities. It does not use logical gates; it has Condition blocks that evaluate comparative relationships (equality, precedence) that supply similar functionality. COPMA III holds much of its procedure descriptions as blocks of natural-language text, related graphically as predecessor/successor and parent/child relations. It explicitly represents whether subtasks may be performed sequentially or in parallel [1] For the chemical process industry, the HAZOPExpert program represents processing steps a GRAFCHART formalism, graphically representing continuously-valued and differential equations, [25] , and see [26] for a review of related knowledge representations for the process industries.
Qualitative Reasoning [6] Bayesian networks employ causal networks similar to PRA trees. Nodes in both techniques store probabilities, but the semantics of a probability varies between the approaches. Edges in a Bayesian network can describe correlation, rather than causation per se. Some Bayesian networks associate a probability with causal edges as well as with the nodes. Bayesian networks are used both for diagnostics and prognostics. Figure 2 shows a standard example network. A proposed Bayesian Network Interchange Format [12] includes representations for probability distributions (including multi-modal distributions) not just fixed-point probabilities.
Controlled Vocabularies
In medicine, the HL7 (an ANSI Standards Development Organization, www.hl7.org) is developing the Reference Information Model, RIM [19] . RIM is not an interchange format; it is an approach to specifying data formats. The RIM orders how medical terms can be composed (how to specify a concept like "a benign fibrous tumor partially removed from the anterior of the liver.") This is done using controlled vocabularies (organized in taxonomies, or ontologies) and compositional rules. RIM is a metastandard for specifications; several sets of RIM-compliant terminologies are being advanced, including SNOMED [20] , GLIF [21] and GELLO [22] . In fault-tree analysis, similar ideas are explored in GALILEO. [24] Neither RIM nor these approaches specifies a causalnetwork interchange format per se. But RIM's use of controlled vocabularies is applicable to causal networks. In causal networks, nodes have names, which represent conditions, events, actions etc. In the other methodologies surveyed so far, the node names are free-form natural language text. The user can put any arbitrary text string in the name; automated inference engines analyzing the graph do not use the string except to report results.
Controlled vocabularies offer several advantages. A node name would be a well formed composition of defined entities and actions This would allow authoring tools to prompt users for default causes, automation of modelchecking (spotting causal links that don't make sense, or inferring missing links) and to automate the linking of causal-graph tools to other online resources (databases, webpages, illustrations and photography…) Controlled vocabularies make information more comprehensible to users, too.
Medical terminology suffers from the "Shakespeare Syndrome" -a profusion of different (long, Latinized) terms, all meaning the same thing. (A heart attack is a myocardial infarction is acute coronary heart disease..) Practitioners frequently do not understand each others' jargon. This is not just a problem across national boundaries; it's an issue when sending medical records between departments within a hospital. Controlled vocabularies allow practitioners to be sure they understand each other. We know this is also an issue in the aerospace community; we believe it bedevils other communities as well.
Interchange between specification and simulation
Our own work [8, 9, 10] provides an interchange format between two software tools. HIT (Hazard Identification Toolkit, implemented in Protégé) holds a functional model of a system (including its normal and abnormal operation.) CONFIG is a hybrid discrete/continuous simulator for lightweight analysis of event sequences in hazard scenarios.
Models and data can be transferred between the two applications to assist in identifying hazards in the operation of a system. A user of HIT constructs the system model from components selected from the HIT library of component classes and component connections. The description of a HIT component class may specify the entities that are the products and side effects generated by the component in different modes of operation and also the component's vulnerabilities to external entities while in a given mode. A rule-based HIT tool can then perform a reachability analysis that finds paths over which an entity or state generated by one component in the system may reach other components that are vulnerable to that entity or state. This analysis is illustrated in Figure 3 . These paths capture combinations of states that are also captured in fault tress and PRA and imply hazard scenarios. Effectiveness scores can also be computed, based on normalized ratings of effects of hazards and mitigations.
When HIT has reasoned qualitatively that a scenario is of concern, CONFIG can be used to analyze it in a numerical simulation. The user can construct an operational scenario that could produce the hazardous situation, and could evaluate the operation of mitigations The HIT model can then be translated to a CONFIG model, and the operational scenario can similarly be translated to a script to be executed by the CONFIG simulator. While CONFIG has no formal representations of hazards and vulnerabilities, its numerical simulation capabilities may be used to provide lightweight analysis of cascades of events and of the plausibility and severity of potentially hazardous scenarios identified by HIT.
HIT provides a specification for a CONFIG system model, and also provides a hazard scenario (an accident or potential accident) to CONFIG. The interchange is illustrated in Figure 4 . The HIT/CONFIG scenario interchange format specifies features applicable to any causal-model interchange format. It distinguishes between different itemclasses: functions, entities, hazards, mitigations and behaviors.
It locates these items in computational ontologies. That is, there are taxonomies (inheritance hierarchies) of item-classes, with attributes for the classes. Events in the scenario are built by composing these items and assigning values to their attributes.
Emerging standards for interchange formats
There is widespread recognition of the usefulness of a standard interchange format, especially for fault trees and PRA. Several groups are proposing standards.
Standard for the Exchange of Product model data, or STEP (ISO-10303) [13] is an existing family of International Standard for the computer-interpretable representation and exchange of product data. It is in use in the Systems Engineering community. A team is working on STEP's AP233 and AP239, which will include a standard for representing fault trees. STEP currently models in EXPRESS, an 80's-era format. AP239 will move to a Uniform Modeling Language (UML) representation. Working in tandem with the AP239 effort, SysML Partners, in its Systems Modeling Language effort [16] , is developing modeling standards for fault trees.
ISO-17666 [18]
Space Systems -Risk Management is an emerging standard, originating from the European Space Agency.
While it doesn't set forth representational standards for causal graphs per se, its documentation standards for risks call out relevant features and a standard terminology for risks. Its risks are similar to fault tree's top events. Its definition and procedures for determining event criticality could provide the semantics for criticality measures in an interchange format. 
REPRESENTATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
There is much commonality in all these methodologies. Presumably, that which is common is sure to be included in any new representational standard. This section first lists the 'easy' necessary elements.
But in today' practice, complex causal explanations are not usually captured in any computer readable format, be it proprietary or open. For the most part, though, these causal explanations are captured in English text, diagrams and animated PowerPoint charts. For an excellent example of this, see [4] .
Any emerging representational standard should anticipate its most demanding applications. It should be capable of expressing complex causal relationships -relationships that exceed the expressiveness of any of today's software tools. As we researched the domains discussed in the last section, we questioned practitioners. We asked, "What critical causal relationships are most taxing? What is most difficult to explain, to represent, to reason about? What critical thing is likely to get left out of a standard? What aspects of the representation are crucial to comprehending the content?" The balance of this section synthesizes their answers, along with our own experiences in automating reasoning about causation. Complex relationships-There are relationships that tax the expressive ability of today's tools. We do not know the best ways to encode them in a standard, but any group producing a standard interchange format should address them.
Good computing practice-The
• Exploded/Subsumption relations -generally, each causal step in a sequence can potentially expand into its own causal network. The lower level network may take inputs from conditions and events not shown at the higher level.
• Feedback loops -fault-tree analysis and PRA prohibits causal feedback loops. The representation should store the location where the loop is broken. It should also be possible to specify information about the loop itself -whether it is positive or negative feedback, the gain around the loop, or the time-constants associated with it.
• Most cyclic behaviors are representable as closed causal loops.
Cyclic behavior is abstracted to parameters (frequency, amplitude, gain, decay rate) at a higher level. Causal inputs at the lower cyclic level must flow up to the parameter level.
• Time to effect -causal links may have latencies • Alternative testimonies of events -Accident reports are used to build a fault tree. Witnesses may give contradictory testimony. Fault trees don't currently capture this.
• Divergent/Convergent causation -Cause C1 increases intermediate condition I1 and decreases I2. I1 and I2 both promote effect E1, so C1 has a mixed effect on E1. Represent the information that one leg of the causal chain is stronger than the other, and that increasing C1 tends to increase E1.
• Discretization -Causal reasoning involve converting ranges of continuous variables into discrete-valued variables. A numeric temperature value gets simplified into Hot/Normal/Cold. The numeric endpoints of the qualitative ranges may be conditionalized on the system state.
• Represent mode transitions.
• Represent events that are correlated but where causality is unknown.
• Systematic conditions can affect the probabilities of many nodes at once. Poor maintenance, corrosive environments, inadequate training, financial pressure, low morale, startup/turnaround… These systemic effects should be representable without having causal edges drawn from each systemic cause to every single affected node.
• A causal subgraph may be repeated in a large causal graph, representing multiple instances of the same general type, but with different inputs. E.g. in a fault tree, a loss may have been caused by a series of operational errors caused by inexperienced personnel. Joe was out with the flu Wednesday; Jane was out with the flu Friday. The 'employee sick' subgraph should be instantiated twice, with different values.
• Race conditions occur when there are two causal chains with opposite effects; whichever finishes first controls. Again, these need to explicitly representable and abstractable to a higher level.
• Software fails differently than do components. In fault tree/PRA, it is conventional to treat software failure similarly to either a component failure or to a human error. But software failure is unique. Any representational standard must pay particularly close attention to the special representational demands of software, and the particular ways it fails. A discussion of this exceeds the scope of this article, but interested readers should consult [7] .
Presentation-Graphs are viewed graphically. Causal graphs must be both human-and machine-readable. The graphical presentation of a causal network should also be preserved across tools, so that users can both verify and learn from shared causal models. Within a particular view of the data, the standard should associate with nodes and edges:
• Size, shape, shape orientation (rotation) • Groupings (sets of items that can be selected and moved as a unit)
• Icons (e.g., different .gif images for conditions, functions, mitigations) • A page, or sheet (specify that some subsection of the overall graph appears in a single view) • Boxes that enclose multiple nodes locate events w.r.t. equipment or organizations, and emphasize when causal chains cross system boundaries.
• Free text and graphics that can be placed in the graphic view, not associated with particular nodes and edges (e.g., a key for the graphic conventions.) Certain causal relationships should have standard graphical representation • Links to nodes distant or in other subgraphs.
• Inhibition, representing 'When A is true, it breaks the causal link from B to C.' (Logically, this can be composed with NOT and AND gates, but a more compact graphic representation is desirable. See 
CONCLUSIONS
Teams in several fields are creating standard interchange formats. These formats will keep modelers from being tethered to a single proprietary tool, will allow autogeneration of causal models, and will allow causal analysis tools to be integrated to auxiliary services. The several teams should consider coordinating their efforts and borrowing the best ideas across disciplines. They should also ensure that the forthcoming standards can encode the most difficult modeling challenges -causal relationships that exceed the scope of any of today's tools. The standards should address the graphical presentation of causal models, so that both machines and people can read the causal knowledge.
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